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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
D - - - p - - - - -, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SOCIAL SERVICE AND CHILD WEL-
FARE DEPARTMENT OF THE RE-
LIEF SOCIETY GENERAL BOARD 
ASSOCIATION OF THE CHURCH OF 
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER - DAY 
SAINTS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10892 
DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
This appeal was from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
The Honorable Leonard H. Elton, District Judge. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Respondent Social Service and Child Welfare De-
partment of the Relief Society General Board Association of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints respectfully 
petitions this court for rehearing in the above entitled cause 
and alleges that the court in its majority opinion erred on 
the following points: 
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POINT ONE 
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN ITS 
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN RE-
VERSING THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT -------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
POINT TWO 
THIS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE 
TRIAL COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF CON-
SIDERATION OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD AND IN ORDERING COMPLI-
ANCE BY PERSONS NOT PARTY TO THIS 
PROCEEDING WHO MAY HA VE THE FORE-
GOING OR OTHER INDEPENDENT ISSUES 
TO RAISE AND WHO HAVE NOT HAD 
"THEIR DAY I NCOURT" ------------------------------------------ 7 
POINT THREE 
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER 
SHOULD BE OBTAINED AS SOON AFTER 
BIRTH AS POSSIBLE __________________________________________________ 13 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REC-
OGNIZE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY, 
WHICH POLICY WOULD UPHOLD AGENCY 
PLACEMENT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE ________________________________________________________________________________ 19 
Respondent, recognizing the emotional and social con-
sequences of this case further petitions the court, in grant-
ing this motion to set the same for argument at an early 
date. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant and Respondent prays that 
this action be reheard by this Honorable Court, that such 
rehearing be scheduled for an early setting and that the 
3 
foregoing errors of the court be corrected in the interest of 
law and justice. 
EARLS. SPAFFORD 
SP AFFORD & YOUNG 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSI-
TION OF THIS COURT ON ORIGINAL HEARING 
This is a case involving an attempted rescission by a 
natural mother of her consent to an adoption. The proceed-
ing was in Habeas Corpus. The trial court denied the Writ. 
The Supreme Court by a 3 to 2 decision reversed the Trial 
Court and ordered a return of the child. Justice Henroid 
wrote the majority opinion. Justice Tuckett and Justice 
Callister concurre\l( Justice Ellett and Chief Justice Crockett 
dissented. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND INTRODUCTION 
The facts set forth in Respondent's Brief on appeal 
and in the dissenting opinion of Justice Ellett and Chief 
Justice Crockett accurately reflect the records and will be 
referred to in the following arguments: 
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While it is not the Respondent's intent to ask the Court 
to merely reconsider those points which have been previously 
fully considered, the Respondent does not agree with the 
Court's holding and rationale as expressed in the majority 
opinion and desires to suggest certain facts which the ma-
jority opinion in our judgment seemingly overlooked. It 
appears to Respondent that the majority failed to treat and 
apparently failed to consider certain controlling principles 
urged by Defendants in its original brief herein and certain 
matters of law which have been binding upon this court 
under the doctrine of stare decisis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN ITS ANAL-
YSIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN REVERSING THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The trial court's findings were made after hearing 
sharply conflicting testimony. For example, Dana Phelps 
testified that Mrs. Stewart told her the consent would be 
obtained two or three days after birth to assure that the 
mother was not under the influence of narcotics or anas-
thesia. (Tr. p. 20). Mrs. Stewart testified that she told 
Dana Phelps she would ordinarily obtain the consent the 
day after the delivery. (Tr. p. 69). Dana Phelps testified she 
did not recall a telephone call from Mrs. Stewart about com-
ing to the hospital for the consent. (Tr. p. 18 and 27). Mrs. 
Stewart testified that she called Dana Phelps on December 
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17, 1966, to say that she was coming for the consent on De-
cember 18, 1966 and Dana Phelps said "fine." (Tr. p. 63). 
Dana Phelps testified she did not discuss other counseling 
services with Mrs. Stewart. (Tr. p. 25-26). Mrs. Stewart 
testified that Dana Phelps refused counseling. (Tr. 62). 
Dana Phelps testified that she never intended to place the 
baby for adoption. (Tr. 24). Mrs. Stewart (Tr. p. 72-73), 
Mrs. Bridgewater (Tr. p. 112, 118-119), and Dr. Hebertson 
(Tr. p. 77), testified that Dana Phelps, expressly decided on 
adoption. Barbara Phelps and William Phelps testified 
generally that Dana Phelps was crying and not coherent the 
day following the delivery. Mrs. Stewart, Dr. Hebertson 
and Mrs. J erominski testified generally that Dana Phelps 
was not continually crying and was quite coherent the day 
after the delivery. Dr. Clark testified generally that Dana 
Phelps' decision-making capacity was impaired the day fol-
lowing delivery from various factors including sleep de-
privation and narcotics. Dr. Hebertson testified Dana 
Phelps did not have unusual reaction to narcotics and the 
impact of the small dose was over in two hours; further that 
she suffered no sleep deprivation and was competent to 
make a decision the day following the delivery. The point 
should not be belabored. The evidence was in sharp conflict. 
Recognizing the obligation of Utah Constitution, article 
VIII, sec. 9 and URCP 72 (a) to review questions of fact and 
law in equity cases, this Court's decision is a dramatic de-
parture from the long established principles for appellate 
review of equity cases. The equity practice of hearing de 
novo on appeal arose from the English Chancery practice of 
hearing equity cases on depositions. The shift to the trial 
to the court on oral evidence, with the consequent advantage 
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to the trial court in making factual determinations, resulted 
in a change in the equity practice of review. Pound, Appel-
late Procedure in Civil Cases, pp. 300-302 (1941). The 
change in practice was reflected early by this Court. 
This court has frequently held that even on ap-
peals in equity cases notwithstanding both questions 
of law and facts are subject to review, the findings 
of the trial court will not be set aside when the evi-
dence is conflicting, unless the evidence is clearly 
insufficient. Wright v. Union Pa.cific R. Co. 22 Utah 
338, 344-4, 62 P. 317 (1900.) 
This principle has been applied time and again by this 
court. Beesley v. Boa.rclma.n 50 Utah 149,, 166 P. 991 (1917); 
Sta.nley v. Sta.nley 97 Utah 520, 94 P. 2d 465 ( 1939) ; Shaw 
v. Jeppson 121 Utah 155, 239 P. 2d 745 (1952) ; Lawler v. 
Lawler 121Utah201, 240 P. 2d 271 (1952) and McMahon v. 
Ta.nner 122 Utah 333, 249 P. 2d 502 (1952) are a few of the 
many decisions reiterating this principle. It has likewise 
been applied to cases of the precise kind before this Court. 
Walton v. Koffman 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97 (1946) and 
Wilson v. Pierce 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963). 
The majority of this Court has said, "I am not im-
pressed in this case with the rather worn cliche about the 
trial court being in a better position to determine weight and 
credibility and that we should not substitute our judgment 
for his unless we are convinced he made improper findings. 
There is just as valid a rule to the effect that we must do 
our own weighing and find our own facts in an equity case 
like this ... " The "just as valid a rule" which this Court 
applies is the old English Chancery rule applicable to cases 
hear9 on deposition. 
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"On a motion for a new trial, supported and re-
sistetl, as in the case at bar, on ex Parte affidavits, 
those making the affidavits are not subject to cross-
examination, and not being before the trial judge, his 
opportunity to judge of their credibility, and the 
weight of their statements, is not better than the 
appellate court. In all such cases and in equity cases 
where the evidence consists exclusively of deposi-
tions, the reason upon which the decisions quoted are 
based fails, and the rule established by them has no 
application to such cases. Wright v. Union Pacific R. 
Co. supra at p. 345 (emphasis supplied). 
Where the evidence is in conflict and credibility and. 
demeanor testimony is involved, the appellate court in an 
equity case will defer the primary inferences to be drawn 
from demeanor testimony to the trial court. 5 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice para. 52.03 (1). That principle is now rejected 
by this Court in favor of a de novo review standard applic-
able to documentary and non-demeanor testimony but never 
applied to a trial by oral testimony. This Court has now 
reduced the equity trial court to a mere fact gatherer. Re-
spondent respectfully urges this Court to withdraw its 
opinion and continue the sound practice of 100 years. 
POINT TWO 
THIS COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL 
COURT IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION OF 
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD AND IN OR-
DERING COMPLIANCE BY PERSONS NOT PARTY TO 
THIS PROCEEDING WHO MAY HAVE THE FOREGO-
ING OR OTHER INDEPENDENT ISSUES TO RAISE 
AND WHO HAVE NOT HAD "THEIR DAY IN COURT." 
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The proceeding before the Court arises on petition for 
Habeas Corpus to determine custody of an infant. As J us-
tice Crockett points out in his dissenting opinion, and even 
Appellant urges in her brief (Brief for Appellant pp. 39-40), 
the paramount concern is the welfare and happiness of the 
child. It has always been recognized by courts of equity that 
on questions of custody the interest of the child comes first 
and the interest of the parent comes second. The principle 
has reached the status of a truism and elaborate citation 
would simply be pedantic. 43 CJS Infants sec. 7 ; 27 Am. 
Jur. Infants sec. 108. Yet this Court gives virtually no con-
sideration to what is the best interest of the child. This 
Court simply concludes that Appellant is "presumtively" a 
"chaste, employed, moral, Christian young woman." The 
Court apparently accepts the approach of the Appellant 
(Brief for Appellant p. 40) that in the absence of evidence 
rebutting the presumption in favor of the natural parent, 
the issue is resolved that the best interest of the child is to 
be reared by the natural parent. The question is not simply 
whether the natural mother is "loose, promiscuous or a 
lady of the pavements." Previously this Court has said, 
"Nevertheless, when questions of child custody 
arise, the welfare of the child and her chances for a 
suitable home environment and advantages in nur-
ture, training and education to the end that she may 
live and be conditioned for a well adjusted, happy 
and useful life are important factors to consider." 
In Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah 525, 252 P. 2d 
223 (1953}. 
The issue of the child's welfare is too vital to be re-
solved by the procedural technicalities useful for disputes 
over chattels or promissory notes. 
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Dr. Hebertson's opinion that Appellant would be a 
"competent mother" (Tr. pp. 36, 92) is not an adequate 
determination of the best interest of the child. This para-
mount issue can only be determined with the presence and 
participation of the other parties in interest, the parents 
who have nurtured the child since birth. Appellant did not 
include them as parties to her action and made no effort to 
pursue the issue on trial. Appellant's easy answer (Brief for 
Appellant pp. 7-8) is that Respondent knows the names of 
the parents so Respondent should produce them. As this 
Court knows, however, Respondent is prohibited from dis-
closure of the names of the parents by regulations of the 
Utah Department of Welfare which controls Respondent's 
· license. Regulation of the Department of Public Welfare, 
Private Child Placing Agencies, Licensing and Inspection, 
secs. 7411-7413. The power of forcing disclosure is not with 
Respondent, but with the Appellant. 
The law as it relates to jurisdiction of parties is fully 
resolved and need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that no 
court has jurisdiction over a party unless such party has 
submitted to such jurisdiction, otherwise waived service of 
process, or unless process has been served upon him. 20 Am. 
Jur. 2d 465. It has been held that it is the very essence of 
due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution, that power to hear and 
determine a controversy in personam is not vested in a court 
if it has not jurisdiction over the parties. James H. Rhodes 
& Co. v. Chansovsky 137 NJL 459, 60 A. 2d 623. 
Our rules of procedure provide the mechanics by which 
the adopted parents could have been made party hereto. We 
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respectfully submit that these persons should be afforded 
their "day in court." 
One example of a vital issue neglected in this proceed-
ing is the impact on the child of separation from the only 
parents it knows. Appellant's only expression on the subject 
is the euphemistic reference on page 32 of her brief that no 
"vested rights" have intervened. Consider the recent case 
of In Re Adoption of Richardson 59 Cal. Rotr. 323 (1967) 
wherein the California Court of Appeals reversed the re-
fusal of the trial court to allow deaf-mute parents to adopt 
the child in question. The testimony on the impact on the 
nine month old child of separation from the only parents it 
knew is significant to this case. Dr. Arthur H. Parmelee, Jr., 
Director of the Pediatrics Clinic at the University of Cali-
fornia at Los Angeles, stated, supra p. 329: 
"Disruption of the continuity of care of this 
baby at his present age is critical and could be perm-
anently damaging to him. It is well known that 
babies manifest their greatest anxiety over separa-
tion from their parents in the age period of eight 
months to two years. This little boy is now being 
separated from the only parents he knows. He will 
go into a temporary foster home where he will try 
to make new attachments. Then he will be placed in 
a new home and the emotional separation from his 
foster home will take place. This sequence of events 
in this age period can be devastating to the develop-
ment of healthy emotional attachments to people for 
the remainder of this child's life." (Emphasis in 
original). 
The child's pediatrician, Dr. Neil N. Litman stated, supra 
p. 329: 
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" ... ; the child being very sensitive at age nine 
months has received a real shock in being removed 
from this relationship and if this condition persists, 
will undoubtedly receive a shock to its nervous and 
emotional development of a high order." (Emphasis 
in original). 
The consequence of separation from the parents who have 
nurtured the baby at issue in the case at bar is common 
knowledge to men of medicine. Anna Freud, Normality and 
Pathology in Childhood, International Univ. Press (1965); 
Winnicott, The Ordinary Devoted Mother and Her Baby, 
Tavistock Puhl. (1949) ; James, "Premature Ego Develop-
ment; Sqme Observations Upon Disturbances in the First 
Three Years of Life," 41 International Jour. of Psychoanal-
ysis 228 (1960); Anna Freud and D. Burlingham, War and 
Children, International Univ. Press (1943); Anna Freud 
and D. Burlingham, Infants without Families, International 
Univ. Press (1944); Bowlby, "A Two Year Old to Hospital" 
7 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 82 (1952) ; Spitz, An-
aclitic Depression" 2 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 313 
(1946) and Bowlby, "Grief and Mourning in Infancy and 
Early Childhood" 15 Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 9 
(1960); Robertson, Young Children in the Hospital, Tav-
istock Puhl. (1958) ; Spitz, "Hospitalization" 1 Psychoanal-
ytic Study of the Child 53 (1945). 
General rules of medical experience are still not a sub-
stitute for concrete evidence on the emotional development 
of the particular child in question. Yet legal decisions of the 
kind before the court cannot be made in ignorance of the 
learning of other professions intimately involved in the legal 
issues this Court must decide. The issue of the child's best 
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interest cannot be made by default where the essential in-
formation is missing because the parties necessary to a full 
determination are within the control of Appellant and be-
yond the control of Respondent. The gap in evidence cannot 
be filled in cases of this kind by the breezy presumption that 
the child's best interest will be served with the natural 
mother in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Indeed 
this Court has suggested that the burden is on the natural 
parents to show that the welfare of the child requires the 
annulment of a previous transfer and the return of custody 
to the natural parent. Stanford v. Gray 42 Utah 228, 129 P. 
423 (1912). In any event, we reiterate such matter cannot 
be determined without evidence. 
Finally, Respondent urges this Court to clarify a pres-
ent ambiguity in the law of this State regarding the applica-
tion of the best interest of the child principle. It is clear 
that in the case at bar, an issue of custody arising on peti-
tion for Habeas Corpus, that the best interest of the child is 
the paramount concern. Walton v. Koffman 110 Utah l, 
169 P. 2d 97 (1946) and Taylor v. Waddoups 121 Utah 279, 
241 P. 2d 157 (1952). What would have been the situations 
if Appellant's position had been asserted as an objection to 
an adoption petition as distinguished from a custody dispute 
as is the case at bar? The law on such a question is unclear. 
Two prior decisions, In Re Adoption of Walton, 123 Utah 
380, 259 P. 2d 881 (1953) and Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown 
2 Utah 2d 30, 268 P. 2d 995 (1954), suggest that in an adop-
tion proceeding, the court cannot consider the best interest 
of the child until the court has first determined that the 
natural parent has abandoned the child, as in Re Adoption 
of Walton, or the parental rights have been terminated as 
in Deveraux' Adoption vs. Brown. Yet in Wilson v. Pierce 
14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P. 2d 925 (1963), another adoption pro-
ceeding where the natural parent claimed no abandonment, 
this Court indicated that the best interest of the child is the 
primary concern. And in Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah 
525, 252 P. 2d 229 (1953), wherein the natural mother 
sought to revoke consent in an adoption proceeding, the 
Court applies the best interest of the child principle. 
The question is not necessary to the determination of 
the case at bar because it is a custody case on Habeas Corpus 
where all agree that the best interest of the child is para-
mount, and not an adoption proceeding. The question is 
likely to arise in an adoption. The Court's opinion, however, 
moves on the presumption that the best interests of the child 
Ii~ in the return of custody to the natural mother with no 
basis in the record upon which such presumptive determina-
tion can be made. Should the trial court hear evidence on 
the best interest of the child in accord with Wilson v. Pierce 
and in Re Adoption of D - - - or reject the evidence as sug-
gested in In Re Adoption of Walton and Deveraux' Adoption 
v. Brown? Respondent urges this Court to resolve the ques-
tion in favor of the position of Wilson v. Pierce and In Re 
Adoption of D - - -. As the case at bar makes clear, failure to 
do so will result in determination of only part of the issues. 
Of course the court cannot permit the adoption of a child 
over the objection of the natural parent simply because 
some may feel that the child will have a brighter future in 
some other home. But neither can the court divorce the issue 
of custody from the adoption proceeding. In Re Adoption 
of Walton and Deveraux' Adoption v. Brown, does just 
that. The custodial issue of the child's best interest is just 
as vital a question as the adoption issue of terminating 
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the natural parent's rights. The approach of Wilson v. 
Pierce and In Re Adoption of D - - - is the sounder approach 
as including consideration of all of the issues involved and 
should be clarified as the law of this jurisdiction. 
POINT THREE 
THE CONSENT OF THE NATURAL MOTHER 
SHOULD BE OBTAINED AS SOON AFTER BIRTH AS 
POSSIBLE. 
Mrs. Stewart testified that it was normal agency prac-
tice to obtain the consent of the natural mother the day 
after delivery. (Tr. 69-70). The majority of this Court 
would characterize this practice as a tawdry attempt to 
snatch the child from the mother with unreasoning haste. 
Yet as recently as 1961, this Court faced a claim of duress 
in consenting to adoption by an unmarried mother where 
the consent was obtained the day following delivery. The 
claim was rejected summarily. Thomas v. Children's Aid 
Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961). 
The customary agency practice reflected in the case at 
bar is not a hasty and conniving plot to deprive the natural 
mother of her child while her wits are confused. The prac-
tice reflects the agency's experience with the emotional 
conflicts which plague any mother in the unfortunate posi-
tion of Appellant. This Court appeals for a reasonable 
length of time on the apparently logical assumption that 
time will enable the mother to reach a reasoned rather than 
an emotional decision. But the decision to give up a child is 
never emotionally neutral no matter when it is made. By 
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well-intentioned use of a priori reasoning, this Court has 
chosen the seemingly logical conclusion that the mother's 
decision, even if not emotion free, will be more realistic and 
deliberate if made some time after the pain and emotional 
turmoil of birth is past. But one of our greatest justices, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes recognized, "The life of the law has 
not been logic; it has been experience." Holmes, The Com-
mon Law 1 (1881). The experience of the experts in social 
work and psychiatry is that time is the greatest enemy and 
not the friend of the mother in this predicament. The delib-
erated decision before birth that the natural mother cannot 
provide for the full welfare of the child becomes twisted 
with doubts apd conflicts in the emotional turmoil after 
birth. For example, Dr. Ner Littner, in his discussion of 
the paper "A Program of Adoptive Placements For Infants 
Under Three Months" by Fradkin and Krugman, states, 26 
American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 577, 591 (1956) says: 
"The first problem is the ability of the natural 
mother to relinquish her child completely at birth. 
The results of the excellent casework reported on in 
this paper confirm what we already know about nat-
ural mothers; namely, that where adoption is indi-
cated, both the mother and her child are far better 
off emotionally if she gives up her child as soon after 
birth as possible. The best way to help her reach such 
a firm conclusion is to provide her with active and 
intensive casework help as early in her pregnancy as 
possible." (Emphasis in original). 
Further, Leontine Young, Professor in Casework, 
School of Social Administration, Ohio State University, 
states in her study, Out of Wedlock - A Study of the Prob-
lems of the Unmarried Mother and Her Child. (New York 
1954) : 
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What has not always been seen so clearly is that 
for many unmarried mothers early surrenders are 
helpful and often important. No thinking person 
would assume that this is invariably so or that this 
should be ipso facto a general rule. The fact remains 
that girls who have had and used help in making a 
decision and in facing their own feelings about this 
decision before the birth of the baby are rarely 
helped and are frequently damaged by a waiting pe-
riod of any duration in executing that decision after 
the baby's birth. This is particularly true of the 
neurotic girl, who has great difficulty in sustaining 
any decision for long. Frequently the adoption ag-
ency and the worker are strange to her; and her ties 
with the previous worker who has helped her in the 
past are weakened by the change, by the fact that 
the adoption agency now has the baby under care 
and must complete the arrangements directly with 
her, and by her greater inaccessibility as she returns 
to active living in the community. Over and over 
these girls use this waiting period only to review and 
relive all the questions and problems which had been 
relieved by their original decision. Again they are 
harassed by the same doubts and conflicts, grown 
now even more confusing and difficult, since they are 
less protected. They are not free to look to the future 
or to consider their own plans and actions, bound as 
they are to the treadmill of this imminent decision. 
Occasionally it has been mistakenly supposed 
that this very confusion was proof of their need for 
more time. That this is not the fact can be seen in 
the compulsive, phonograph-like repetition of their 
doubts and fears, which nothing but action can term-
inate and which nothing but an analysis of their bas-
ic personality problems could resolve. It is actually 
an agonizing and damaging experience for them, as 
some of the more discerning girls have pointed out 
directly. Objectively no decision can be said to have 
been made until it is acted upon. Until girls as in-
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ternally divided as this have acted upon a decision, 
they can never be free of the tortuous questions that 
went into its making. Most of them in the end return 
to their original decision, but tragically, a few of 
them revert to the hopelessly unrealistic plans with 
wh~ch they began. By the time life has taught them 
just how unrealistic those plans were, it is usually 
too late to help either girl or baby. On the whole any 
girl who has made a clear, thoughtful, and realistic 
decision before the baby is born is helped by an early 
surrender and is spared unnecessary suffering. One 
girl who had surrendered her baby directly from the 
hospital remarked, "I didn't know until I saw other 
girls who have had to wait how lucky I was and how 
much I was spared." 
... This same attitude has also created a good 
deal of confusion as to the final validity of surren-
ders. This is primarily a legal question, and there is 
urgent need of a clear, uniform legal definition of 
the effectiveness and finality of the surrender itself. 
Lack of such a definition has resulted in some tragic 
situations and a lack of security for everyone in-
volved. On the one hand it has left a convenient loop-
hole for the occasional psychopathic girl who wishes 
to take her baby back because a change in circum-
stances has indicated a way in which he could be of 
use to her. In the absence of clear safeguards she can 
accuse an agency of undue pressure despite the fact 
that her decision was freely made. The popular ap-
peal of such a situation, where the actual facts are 
difficult to prove, cannot be underestimated. It can 
result in disaster for the child and the adoptive par-
ents and in serious trouble for the agency. That same 
girl may later place her baby privately, but the pub-
lic rarely knows about that. (P. 161-164) 
See also, Heller, "Applications by Married Parents for 
Adoptive Placement of Their In-Wedlock Children," XLV 
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Child Welfare 404 ( 1966) ; Gallagher, "The Professions' 
Roles In Serving the Unmarried Mother and her Baby" Ad-
dress to the National Conference of Social Welfare, Chicago, 
Illinois, May 13, 1958, available through Children's Bureau 
of the United States Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare. 
Of course Respondent does not urge this Court to abdi-
cate its obligation to determine legal policy to the social 
workers and psychiatrists. Respondent does urge that this 
Court consider the accumulated experience of other disci-
plines as it directly bears upon the legal issues facing this 
Court. Re-examination of the record in the light of the com-
mon knowledge of the social workers and psychiatrists, if 
uncommon knowledge to lawyers, reveals that what was 
done in this case was the soundest of social work practice. 
The Appellant sought counsel and advice was given it. In a 
more deliberate and realistic state during her pregnancy, 
Appellant realized that keeping the baby would only be 
destructive of her own and her baby's future welfare. Hav-
ing decided to relinquish the child before birth, Appellant 
was plagued with doubt and conflict about her resolve after 
birth. Mrs. Stewart, knowing by training and experience 
that the emotional turmoil of birth would begin to raise 
doubts and conflicts in the mind of Appellant, sought the 
formal signing of the consent as soon after birth as possible. 
This Court has now completely disregarded the findings of 
the trial court and announced a legal policy that is the very 
antithesis of the practice advocated by the psychiatrists and 
the social workers; the professions who must deal with the 
mother as a human problem and not an abstract legal issue. 
This Court now requires that the mother must wait until 
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she has undoubtedly seen and held her baby before formal 
consent can be obtained. However reasonable intuitive reas-
oning may make a waiting time appear, those who must 
work day-to-day with the unwed mother recognize that 
nothing could be more destructive of the goal the law seeks 
to attain, the best interest of the child. 
POINT FOUR 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE 
ESTABLISHED POLICY, WHICH POLICY WOULD UP-
HOLD AGENCY PLACEMENT UNDER THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
Consider first the words of Justice Henroid in his dec-
laration of policy in the case of Jacob vs. State by and 
through Public Welfare Commission, 7 Utah 2d 304, 322 P. 
2d 720: 
The policy of the law is ... "to allay the fears of 
prospective adoptive parents, and to encourage will-
ing persons to give underprivileged children an op-
portunity in life through adoption, that they would 
otherwise be denied,-without a constant fear that 
the adoption of a child would be fractured." 
While the facts in the Jacob case are in a measure dissimilar 
to those at bar the underlying principles remain the same. 
Justice Crockett stated the policy in this fashion: 
"Public policy favors the adoption of children who 
are left without parental refuge. Once a child has 
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been cast adrift and is without responsible parental 
care, the policy of the law should be to assist in every 
way in establishing a satisfactory parent/child and 
family relationship. Adoptive parents should not be 
discouraged by a construction of the law which 
would cause them to fear the consequences of accept-
ing a child because of the knowledge that the fate of 
their efforts would be at the will of the natural par-
ents." In Re Adoption of D - - - 122 Utah 525, 252 P. 
2d 229. 
Justice Ellett in the case at bar in his dissenting opin-
ion states the policy thusly: 
"If it be decided that a parent can revoke a consent 
at any time before final adoption, great mischief 
will be done to the efforts made by child placing ag-
encies and to parents who wish to adopt children. It 
is not conducive to a good relationship for parents to 
be on tenterhooks for a year or more, fearing to 
bestow their love and affection upon the baby lest 
they have it all snatched away by a natural parent 
who may have a change of mind. Such a holding 
would really open the door to a shakedown in case 
the adoptive parents let their natural love go to the 
child, for they would pay any sum possible to retain 
their child. If, on the other hand, they kept the child 
as a boarder until final adoption was had, the child 
would not be able to receive the love and affection 
which it so much needs for its proper development in 
the beginning of its life." (Emphasis in original) 
This policy was restated by the Utah Legislature in its 
enactment of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Section 55-10-42 which provides: 
"No parent or guardian or other person who by in· 
strument in writing surrenders or has surrendered 
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heretofore the custody of a child to any aid society 
or institution shall thereafter contrary to the terms 
of such instrument be entitled to custody or control 
or authority over or any right to interfere with any 
such child and the same conditions shall prevail 
where the child is or has been delivered to a chil-
dren's aid society or institution by action of any 
proper court." 
The foregoing statute was a declaration of Utah public pol-
icy and has been cited numerous times in support of our 
case law. Its repeal was inadvertent and regrettable, but 
must not be construed as a repudiation of the established 
policy of this state. The court will recall that the repeal was 
a perfunctory act incident to a blanket revision of adminis-
trative practices in the Juvenile Court. In 1965 some 62 
sections of the Juvenile Court Act were repealed. 
In Respondent's brief on appeal we pointed out the 
amendment in 1965 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
78-30-4 to establish as irrevokable the consent of a minor 
mother to an agency placement. This quite obviously evi-
dences the real intent of the legislature to not change, but 
to strengthen, previously established policy in the law. 
We urge upon the court a re-consideration of Respon-
dent's argument as presented in point five of Respondent's 
brief on appeal but not touched upon in the majority 
opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues which were presented to the court on appeal 
reduce themselves logically to a syllogism with a major and 
minor premise leading to an apparent conclusion. 
1. Major Premise: An unwed natural mother who ex-
ecutes a document of consent to adoption while suffering 
with such impairment as to make her act involuntary has 
not in fact legally consented at all. 
2. Minor Premise: Dana Phelps did not (or did) in fact 
consent to the placement of her child with Respondent for 
purposes of adoption. 
3. Conclusion: Dana Phelps can (or cannot) rescind her 
consent. 
ln analysing the validity of the foregoing syllogism we 
invite the Court to re-examine in depth the record of this 
case. A further careful perusal of the evidence will clearly 
demonstrate the fact that the minor premise to be supported 
by the record must uphold the validity of the consent. Ob-
viously Appellant has no quarrel with the major premise 
and the minor premise and conclusion resolve themselves to 
questions of fact. 
It cannot be overlooked that the testimony of Appel-
lant's witness, Dr. Clark, was based upon a statement of hy-
pothetical facts which the trial court found unsubstantiated. 
Consider this testimony of Dr. Clark: 
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Question: Would it have been difficult for Miss Phelps 
to make a decision such as signing a consent in the state of 
mind that you feel she was in? 
Answer: I can't quite answer your question in terms of 
would it be difficult for her. (Tr. 49, lines 17 to 21.) 
Question: Is the fact, if this is the fact, that there was 
some organic impairment sufficient for you to conclude that 
she was completely incompetent to comprehend what she 
was doing or signing? 
Answer: I can't answer regarding the degree of com-
petency that she might have in coping with specific types of 
problems presented to her. (Tr. 52, line 30, Tr. 53, lines 1 
to 6.) 
The testimony of Respondent's witnesses, all respon-
sible, professional persons who had opportunity to observe 
her reactions at the time in question, generally and specif-
ically sustain the fact of competency. 
It must be remembered that Dana Phelps came to the 
agency of her own volition for a specific service. The very 
qualities ascribed to her, with the possible exception of 
"chaste," led the agency to believe that she had the wisdom 
to decide things for herself. She asked specifically for place-
ment of her child and was fully determined in the course she 
desired to follow. Her confidants were fully supportive of 
her in her decision and assisted in the mechanics of place-
ment. The visit on December 18, was by prior mutual agree-
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ment by telephone and at Dana's request with the expressed 
wish of having the baby placed before Christmas. Accord-
ingly, the baby was placed December 22, 1966. Early place-
ment-yes. Hasty action-indeed not. 
We urge upon the court the singular import of its de-
cision upon the field of Social Welfare Law and the import-
ance of sustaining the declared public policy of this Court 
in the interest of the child. Social Welfare Law is a rapidly 
advancing field of endeavor. The time has arrived for the 
legal profession to create legal policy outside the vacuum of 
its own discipline, and to look to the accumulated experience 
and knowledge of the laws allied fields, that of sociology and 
medicine. The experience of both of those professions teach 
that mother and child are saved needless anguish by sound 
counseling during pregnancy, and if a decision is reached to 
give up the child then, taking the child as soon after birth 
as possible. A fortiori, the interests of the natural mother 
are promoted by establishing finality to her decisions and 
act of consent. 
We appeal to the court in the interest of sound legal 
practice and upon precepts of justice to uphold the sound 
agency practice evident here, deal squarely with the issue 
of jurisdiction as it pertains to the adoptive parents, reverse 
its previous holdings herein, declare anew stated public pol-
icy and resolve the ambiguities that permeate this problem. 
Respondent, together with other licensed agencies, 
adoptive applicants, needful children, and applicants for 
social service view with alarm the impact of the court's 
prior decision. If no security in placements can be assured 
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adopting parents, a great disservice will be done to all 
parties involved. 
We respectfully and sincerely request a reconsideration 
and reversal of the majority opinion as heretofore expressed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SPAFFORD & YOUNG 
Earl S. Spafford 
